We develop a new methodology to extract market expectations of recovery rates that uses information from credit default swap spreads on debt instruments of dierent seniorities, incorporates information on the rm-specic liability structure and allows for deviations from the absolute priority rule. In our empirical analysis, we nd that expected recovery rates exhibit a large cross-sectional and time-series variation and that recovery rates of nancial institutions are on average larger than those of non-nancial companies. Using a panel regression, we show that anticipated government support increases the market expectations of recovery rates of nancial companies and therefore helps to explain these dierences.
Introduction
Credit risk is primarily driven by two components: the probability that a creditor defaults and the recovery rate. While the rst component has received much attention, the literature on the recovery rate is limited. This is particularly true for empirical evidence on the recovery rates of large nancial institutions, although they are the most active (non-sovereign) players on bond and credit derivative markets. 1 One reason for this lack of empirical evidence is the limited number of default events for these companies.
We circumvent this problem by extracting the market expectations of recovery rates from prices of credit default swaps (CDS), one of the largest and most liquid derivative market.
In order to disentangle the recovery rate from the default probability, we use CDS data on debt instruments of the same company that dier in seniority. As both tiers are subject to an identical default probability, we are able to infer information on recovery rates without making assumptions on the common dependence of the two components. Instead, we treat recovery rates as claims on the rm value at default and empirically determine a companyspecic liability structure. We apply our model to a sample covering 65 nancial rms between April 2002 and November 2012 located in the United States and Europe. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset is the most comprehensive empirical evidence on recovery rates of large nancial institutions and covers a total book value of assets of 37,284bn USD. 2
We also add 26 non-nancial companies that have CDS data on subordinated debt to our sample to investigate dierences between both company types.
We make three contributions to the existing literature. First, we propose an approach to isolate recovery rates that combines advantages of existing methodologies. In particular, our setup uses information from credit default swap spreads on debt instruments of dierent seniorities, incorporates information on the rm-specic liability structure and allows for deviations from the absolute priority rule. 3 Applying the model to our sample, we nd that 2 We are also not aware of any other study that collects empirical data on the liability structure of nancial institutions (grouped by seniority) on a large scale. For a study on the debt structure of non-nancial companies see e.g. Colla et al. (2013) .
the mean implied recovery rate for the senior unsecured tier is 50% for the nancial companies and therefore much higher than the mean of 20% for the non-nancial companies. A result that is consistent with the remarkably high recovery rates observed in the CDS market for nancial companies in recent years. 4 Second, we relate the recovery rate estimates to economic determinants using a panel regression. We nd that rm fundamentals and macroeconomic factors that inuence realized recovery rates exert a similar inuence on market expectations of recovery rates. Both, cross-sectional and time-series information thereby explain a large amount of the variation in recovery rates. Third, we elucidate why and to what extent market expectations of recovery rates dier for nancial and non-nancial companies. We therefore regress our recovery estimates on a rating-based measure of expected government support and nd that anticipated government support leads to an increase in expected recovery rates and that this eect is particularly strong during the nancial crisis.
Expected government support actions are part of the explaination why unsecured creditors expect to realize comparatively high recovery rates, although their claims are ranked far below those of other creditors (e.g. depositors). This nding is consistent with previous evidence on market reactions to government support. Hoggarth et al. (2004) review banking crisis from 1977 to 2002 and show that government support protects unsecured creditors from losses during times of market-wide distress. Kelly et al. (2012) show that the default likelihood of the nancial sector in the United States is reduced by expected government support by comparing individual put option prices with those written on an index. Our study complements the latter by adding a recovery rate perspective.
Our results are important for a number of applications: studies that calculate implied default probabilities or counterparty risk exposures based on CDS data frequently use a xed recovery rate assumption (see e.g. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) ). As we show, implied recovery rates exhibit a large cross-sectional and time-series variation. Neglecting these dynamics leads to potentially misleading conclusions. Another application concerns the regulatory resenior creditors have fully recovered their claims. Weiss (1990) , Franks and Torous (1994) and Bris et al. (2006) document that this assumption is frequently violated.
4 The recovery rate on senior unsecured debt is 57% for Washington Mutual, 68% for CIT Group, 92% quirements of Basel III that allow banks to specify recovery rates for their exposures including an estimate for bad states of the economy (downturn loss given default). Relying only on the limited number of realizations of recovery rates for large banks might be misleading for research in this area.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we show how implied recovery rates can be inferred from data on CDS spreads that dier in seniority. Section 3 presents the data we have used to estimate the recovery rates. In Section 4, we discuss the steps for the implementation of our model. Section 5 presents our recovery rate estimates. Section 6 describes the results of regressing the implied recovery rates on empirical determinants including government support. Section 7 discusses the results of our panel regression, Section 8 concludes.
2 Modeling the implied recovery rate
In the following paragraphs, we show how to extract an implied recovery rate from CDS of senior unsecured and subordinate debt. We attribute a payout function to each type of debt that maps the rm value at default to the instrument-specic payo depending on the rm's individual debt structure and a parameter that determines the strength of the seniority violation. Our setup is based on the methodology of Schläfer and Uhrig-Homburg (2013) augmented by accounting for seniority violations. 5
Unlike methodologies that use equity (option) market data to achieve an isolation of recovery rates (see e.g. Jarrow (2001) , Le (2007) , Carr and Wu (2010) and Conrad et al. (2013) ), we do not need to rely on integrated markets. We also do not need to assume that the dependence between the default probability and the recovery rate is exclusively governed by the risk-free rate as in Doshi (2011) or set the subordinated recovery rate to a xed value as in the approach of Norden and Weber (2012) .
additional unit of x. The given specication could easily be extended to cover more complex seniority violations by adjusting the instrument-specic payout functions. Unal et al. (2003) incorporate seniority violations in a recovery rate model for bonds, which restricts seniority violations to occur only above a certain threshold of x. One could also add an additional payout function to incorporate violations of seniority that benet stock holders, although seniority violations in favor of equity holders have become rare after 2000 (Bharath and Werner (2009) 
Calculation of the debt structure
We augment the data from Markit with information from Capital IQ on the debt structure of each company. 9 As CDS are frequently issued for dierent legal entities, we restrict our sample to companies that are publicly listed in order to exclude subsidiaries. After applying this restriction, we are left with 25,450 weekly observations of 114 companies.
We account for non-debt liabilities such as trade claims, taxes and lease obligations. 10
The classication of these items is based on the literature that deals with seniority in case of a default event (see e.g. Barclay and Smith (1995) , Russell et al. (2006) and Rauh and Su (2010) ). As we are using CDS on senior unsecured and subordinate debt, we are interested in the positions of these instruments in the debt structure. We therefore cluster all liability items into three categories for each company for the year that precedes the date of the respective CDS observation: we use a priority debt class, which includes all items that are more senior than unsecured debt, a senior unsecured class including all senior unsecured bonds and notes and a subordinate class which contains all debt claims that are less senior than the previous class. The priority debt class contains all secured debt as well as accounts payable, current and non-current tax liabilities and capitalized leases. For banks, we add the amount of deposits. For insurance companies, we add liabilities that arise due to obligations from insurance contracts. Appendix B provides an overview of all Capital IQ items that are used in the calculation of the liability structure. Although the overall coverage is extensive, not all items are available for each company and point in time. We require each company to have at least information on both items that form the senior unsecured and the subordinate class and set missing items to zero. Adding these data requirements reduces our sample to 95 companies. We then divide the total amount of each debt class by the sum of all items so that the liability structure positions are given as percentages.
9 In order to match the two databases, we use the historical six-digit cusip from Markit that identies the rm. We manually check these historical cusips to link it with the respective identier of Capital IQ, which ensures that rms that have been acquired or merged throughout the sample period receive the correct Capital IQ identier.
10 We use the term 'debt' and 'liability' interchangeably throughout the paper, implying that our denition of debt comprises items that are no securities (e.g. taxes or lease obligations) and which are usually not considered as being debt.
3.3 Descriptive statistics Table 1 shows the means for the CDS spreads and the corresponding ratios of the senior unsecured and subordinate spreads for our nal sample. 11 The mean senior unsecured spread is 1.18% for nancial and 2.73% for non-nancial companies reecting the fact that nancial companies are better rated. Table 2 describes the average size of the seniority classes. Accordingly, the claims of the priority debt class comprise 79% of all claims for nancial companies and 44% for nonnancial companies. This dierence is primarily driven by the debt structure items that are specic for insurance companies and banks. The mean size of total deposits is 65% and 88%
for contractual insurance obligations, wherever the respective item is available. The mean size of senior unsecured claims is 18% for nancial and 31% for non-nancial companies.
Accordingly, the liquidation of a nancial company has potentially a much more devastating eect on unsecured creditors than the liquidation of a non-nancial company as more creditors with a higher seniority are present. Subordinate debt items account for only 3% of the total debt claims for nancial institutions and make up 25% for non-nancial companies. In order to compare the debt structure to a sample of 305 issuer-rated non-nancial rms of Rauh and Su (2010), we divide the average sizes of the debt classes by total capital. 12 The ratio of senior unsecured debt to total capital of 25% is nearly identical to the value of 24% in Rauh and Su (2010) , while the subordinate debt class in our sample is larger (18% vs. 11%).
This dierence is not surprising given our sample selection that only includes rms whose subordinated debt is large enough to be traded on a derivative market.
Implementation of the model
Our goal is to extract an estimate of the implied rm-wide recovery rate as well as the recovery rates of the senior unsecured and subordinate tier for each company and week where 11 The nal sample is restricted to the companies for which the rm characteristics that we use in the regression analysis in Section 6 are available.
12 Total capital is dened as the sum of the book value of equity and debt. To enable the comparison, we additionally download the book value of debt from Capital IQ on a yearly basis applying the same criteria as in Section 3.2.
we observe a ratio of CDS spreads. We therefore employ the relationship of 2.4 between the observed ratios of CDS spreads and the model counterpart. In particular, we observe a ratio R obs i,t of senior unsecured and subordinate CDS spreads for each rm i and each week t and solve the model ratio R model i,t for the expectation of a one-parametric rm value probability distribution:
The model ratio R model i,t thereby depends on the functional form of the rm value distribution at default f (x), the parameter v i that accounts for seniority violations and the liability structure at default θ i . The following section elaborates on these components.
Specication of the rm value distribution f (x)
Previous approaches that specify rm value distributions frequently employ a two-parametric beta distribution that can take various shapes and is dened on a bounded interval (see e.g. Russell et al. (2006) ). We propose the Rayleigh distribution as a functional specication of f (x) that only depends on one parameter, thereby allowing us to solve 4.1 for each observation. As the Rayleigh distribution is originally dened on the interval [0, ∞), we transform it using the transformation theorem for densities so that it is bounded between zero and one.
Appendix A explains the transformation, the corresponding instrument-specic recovery rate functions and shows dierent shapes of the transformed probability distribution.
4.2 Calculation of the rm-specic liability structure θ i θ i represents the liability structure at default. As the market-expectation of the liability structure at default is non-observable, we approximate it with the latest reported liability structure in the balance sheet of each company (see Section 3.2). We are aware of the fact that there are possibly further claims that can arise in case of a default event, which are usually more senior than the claims of unsecured creditors. Examples include insolvency costs for lawyers and consultants or derivative positions of banks that are either not reported in the balance sheets or whose market values change due to worsening market conditions.
Including these positions would most likely result in larger recovery rate estimates. In the robustness section, we additionally estimate recovery rates without information on the debt composition. Indirect insolvency costs on the other hand, that arise e.g. due to a re-sale eect (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Acharya et al. (2007) ) and nancial distress (Andrade and Kaplan (1998) ), lower the rm value at default and do not change the liability structure.
Calibration of the parameter v i
To calibrate the parameter v i , we use historical data on defaults of nancial and non-nancial companies. Specically, we are interested in rm defaults where senior unsecured creditors receive a payment and subordinate creditors exist. We collect data on defaults from Moody's annual default review (see e.g. Ou et al. (2013) ) for the years from 2008 until 2012 and all recovery rates that are reported in CDS auctions. Appendix D provides details on the preparation of this data and contains a complete list of all 26 default events, where we have information for both tiers. In all cases, subordinate creditors receive a payment, although senior unsecured creditors do not fully recover, which underscores the necessity to account for seniority violations between both debt types. Figure 2 shows the realized senior unsecured and the corresponding subordinate recovery rates (in percent). Subordinate creditors achieve a median recovery rate of 22.90% of the senior unsecured recovery rate. The ratio of both recovery rates exhibits a remarkably stable relationship, which seems to be unaected by the defaulted company being a nancial (indicated by crosses) or a non-nancial company (indicated by dots). We therefore choose the parameter v i so that the relative instrument-specic payout functions (see Section 2.2) reect this nding. In particular, we choose v i for each rm i so that the ratio of the subordinate payo φ
Sub i
and the senior unsecured payo φ
Sen i
for θ 1,i < x < θ * 1,i equals the historical value of z = 22.90%:
This leads to v
Note that the expected instrument-specic recovery rates still depend on the expectation of x (compare 2.5).
Recovery rate estimates
We numerically solve 4.1 for each week and rm for the expectation of the rm value distribution f (x) and obtain 16,604 weekly recovery rate estimates for 91 companies (65 nancial and 26 non-nancial companies). Using the rm-specic liability structure, we also obtain the expected senior unsecured µ Sen and subordinate recovery rates µ Sub . Appendix E provides a complete list of all companies with the respective means. Table 3 summarizes the averages of the three recovery rate types for nancial and nonnancial companies for the full sample as well as for the crisis-and non-crisis period. The rst apparent nding concerns the dierences between nancial and non-nancial companies.
The mean rm value at default is 83% for nancial and 42% for non-nancial companies.
The mean senior unsecured (subordinate) recovery rate is 50% (23%) for nancial and 20%
(6%) for non-nancial companies. This large dierence might be caused by the fact that the nancial companies have a lower credit risk level as indicated by the average credit spreads (see Section 3.3). Altman and Kishore (2002) nd that companies with a high pre-default rating (fallen angels) achieve a mean recovery rate for the senior unsecured (subordinate) tier of 58% (30%), while the overall mean of their sample is 39% (31%). 13 Given that our sample composition is comparable to the former study, market expectations of recovery rates are lower than realizations for both types of companies, with the dierence being larger for non-nancial rms. That is consistent with the intuition that recovery rates under the pricing measure contain a risk premium (Schläfer and Uhrig-Homburg (2013) ). The high average recovery rates of nancial institutions are nonetheless surprising as unsecured creditors only receive a payment at very high rm values at default due to the liability structure. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the recovery rate types for nancial and non-nancial companies.
Accordingly, the rm-values at default of non-nancial rms are not only lower but also exhibit a greater dispersion.
The second apparent nding concerns the dierent time-series pattern for nancial and non-nancial companies. Accordingly, all recovery rate types decline during the crisis period.
That eect is strongest for non-nancial companies, whose average senior unsecured recovery rate declines from 21% to 10%, while that of nancial institutions declines from 50% to 46%. (2009)). In Figure 4 , we also dierentiate for nancial companies that are highly likely to receive government support. While the average recovery rate of the senior unsecured tier is nearly identical before the crisis and declines during the early period of the nancial crisis for both groups, those of nancial institutions that are likely to receive support recover more quickly. Conrad et al. (2013) nd a similar development of the expected recovery rate for 9 nancial institutions that are considered to be systemically relevant.
As 6 (nancial) companies in our sample defaulted during the observation period, we are able to compare the realized recovery rates with market expectations. In Table 4 , we show the latest available senior unsecured recovery rate estimate and those determined in the auction that followed default. We also show descriptive statistics on bonds that are listed as a deliverable security for the respective CDS using the ISINs as provided by the ISDA.
Note that the nal auction results do not necessarily equal the average bond prices due to a cheapest-to-deliver option and deviations that are caused by the auction process (Gupta and Sundaram (2013) ). For Fannie Mae, Allied Irish Banks and Irish Life and Permanent, market expectations seem to anticipate the resulting realizations quite well given the large time span between our latest model observations and auction dates. This dierence between the model expectation and the realized auction result is larger for Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and Glitnir Banki. These companies also exhibit a much stronger uctuation in bond prices indicating that the market had diculties to assess the outcome of those defaults. 14 14 After the default of Glitnir Banki, the government in Iceland announced that it would take control of Overall, we conclude from the descriptive analysis that expected recovery rates exhibit large dierences between nancial and non-nancial companies and that government support might change the time-series behavior of recovery rates of nancial institutions. In the following section, we will investigate the inuence of economic determinants and the role of government support in more detail.
6
Empirical determinants of recovery rate expectations 6.1 Regression setup
Using a panel regression, we study whether rm-level government support anticipations contribute to the dierences between the market expectations of recovery rates of nancial and non-nancial rms. Motivated by earlier ndings in the literature that show that government support is particularly strong during a crisis period (Hoggarth et al. (2004) , Kelly et al. (2012) ) and by the results of our descriptive analysis, we also determine time-series dierences and quantify their impact. In order to control for other cross-sectional and time-series inuences, we select variables from the literature that are known to have an inuence on realized recovery rates and are comparable for nancial and non-nancial companies. For this purpose, we estimate several variants of the following regression:
i,t denotes the expected recovery rate for each rm and week (in percent). Instrumentspecic recovery rates are non-linear functions of the expectation of the rm value at default.
Besides the rm value at default, we therefore include the senior unsecured and subordinate recovery rate as a dependent variable to capture the inuence of the regressors for these types of claims. We estimate the regression using ordinary least squares and correct the standard errors for heteroscedasticity. We also control for rm-and (quarterly) time-xed eects.
the bank. This action greatly disadvantaged senior unsecured creditors.
SupportP rob: we add the Fitch Support Rating as a proxy for the likelihood of government support which is the variable we are mainly interested in. The support rating is intended to represent the likelihood of support for a particular company and the ability of the supporter to provide support. The rating is expressed on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely high probability) to 5 (no reliable support). We follow Gropp et al. (2010) who transform the ve dierent values to a probability measure between 0 and 1. Table 9 provides an overview of the transformation and the denitions of the dierent rating scales. As the rating is only available for banks, we implicitly assume that non-banks are not subject to government support. As we control for rm-and time-xed-eects, we identify the impact of government support by the time-series dierences in the cross-section of our sample companies. Using the ex-ante expectation of government support is also more consistent than employing (ex-post) realized support transactions as these could also negatively aect our dependent variables if a higher support payment has been anticipated. The Fitch Support Rating provides a quantitative measure that is available for a large scale of global banks and therefore much more comprehensive than other approaches that have been employed as e.g. in Conrad et al. (2013) , who use a dummy variable for 6 rms that are considered to be systemically relevant by the Financial Stability Board. We use the interaction term between the crisis dummy and our measure for expected support to identify a dierent pattern during the nancial crisis.
Leverage: leverage is dened as the ratio of the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of all assets. This measure is included in order to capture bankruptcy costs.
The higher the leverage of a rm, the more complex and therefore the more expensive is the resolution of the bankruptcy process (Jankowitsch et al. (2013) ). We expect a negative relationship between this variable and the expected recovery rates.
QRatio: rms with higher growth prospects should exhibit larger recovery rates (Varma and Cantor (2005) ). To control for this eect, we use the QRatio dened as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
Ln(assets): we also add the logarithm of the book value of assets as a measure for the size of the company. The eect of rm size on recovery rates can have dierent causes. Bris et al. (2006) nd that larger rms are more likely to default after chapter 11 which causes higher recovery rates for creditors. On the other hand, rm size might be associated with a higher systemic relevance of a company that might not be captured in our measure for expected government support. r M SCI : Covitz and Han (2005) and Jankowitsch et al. (2013) nd that worsening macroeconomic conditions result in lower realized recovery rates. We therefore include the weekly logarithmic return of the MSCI World Index which comprises the stocks of more than 1500 constituents in developed countries.
We retrieve the book value of liabilities and assets from Capital IQ based on the quarter that precedes the respective spread observation and the market value of equity from Bloomberg (all items are retrieved in USD). In order to ensure that our results are not driven by rms that defaulted, we exclude a limited number of observations with a negative book value of equity. We calculate leverage as the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets, the q-ratio as the ratio of the market and book value of assets, where we approximate the former by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities. We follow Conrad et al. (2013) Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on these variables. The mean leverage ratio of nancial institutions is higher than that of non-nancial companies (94% vs. 72%). The average q-ratio of nancial companies is 1.01 versus 1.48 for non-nancial companies. Financial institutions are on average much larger than non-nancial companies (652bn USD vs. 11bn USD). The most negative weekly return of the MSCI World Index is realized on October 27, 2008 (-17.10%) followed by the most positive return on November 3, 2008 (14.22%). Table 6 shows the regression results for the dierent specications. The adjusted R 2 is 90% for the rm-wide recovery rate as a dependent variable and 68% (65%) for the senior unsecured (subordinate) recovery rate, indicating that the regressors explain a remarkably high amount of the variation in recovery rates. The explanatory power of our regressors for the instrument-specic recovery rates is relatively close to the adjusted R 2 of 66% that Jankowitsch et al. (2013) nd for determinants of realized recovery rates. Firm values at default in general exhibit a smaller variation compared to senior unsecured recovery rates.
Regression results
Regressing only either the rm-or time-xed-eects on the rm values at default shows that cross-sectional determinants matter more than time-series dierences (adjusted R 2 of 88% and 2%). 15 For the senior unsecured recovery rate, the rm-dummies alone result in an adjusted R 2 of 61% while quarterly time dummies alone lead to an adjusted R 2 of 5%.
Excluding xed-eects, we obtain an adjusted R 2 of 47% for the rm value at default and 20% for the senior unsecured recovery rate.
We nd that a higher support probability leads to higher rm-wide recovery rates. In case of the highest possible support probability, the rm-wide recovery rate increases by 0.89%, the senior unsecured recovery rate by 4.24% and the subordinate recovery rate by 1.53%.
Adding the interaction term shows that government support matters especially during the time of the nancial crisis which is associated with a maximum increase of 2.83% in the rm value at default. The senior unsecured (subordinate) recovery rate increases up to 7.74% Leverage has a negative eect on the senior unsecured and the subordinate recovery rate as expected. A one standard deviation increase in leverage causes the senior unsecured recovery rate to fall by 1.56%. The q-ratio is also signicant and leads to an increase in expected recovery rates. Firm size has a positive inuence on the rm recovery rate, but a negative inuence on the subordinate recovery rate. A one percent higher book value of assets leads to a rise in the rm value at default of 2.79%. Consistent with the evidence on realized recovery rates, market expectations of recovery rates are larger for positive aggregated stock market returns.
In summary, we show that market expectations of recovery rates are driven by similar cross-sectional and time-series determinants than realized recovery rates. Expected government support increases all three types of recovery rates and this eect is particularly strong during the time of the nancial crisis. We also nd that cross-sectional and time-series regressors explain a large amount of the variation in recovery rates.
Robustness
We add a robustness test in order to verify whether our results hold regardless of the assumptions we have made concerning the functional form of the rm value distribution at default, the calculation of the liability structure and the specication of the seniority violation. We keep the expected subordinate recovery rate constant to achieve a separation of the implied recovery rate and the default probability. In particular, by setting µ Sub to a constantμ Sub ,
we can rewrite 4.1 as
The setup is employed by Norden and Weber (2012) who use the same methodology for a sample of 20 European banks and setμ Sub to zero arguing that once a nancial institution defaults, subordinate creditors are unlikely to recover anything given the seniority of their claims. As we have shown, this assumption is not reected in realized recovery rates of subordinate debt (as seniority violations occur). We therefore estimate µ Sen using the specication above while settingμ Sub to zero as well as setting it to the historical mean recovery rate of subordinate debt of 24.6% (Ou and Metz (2011) ). We then estimate the regression 6.1 including and excluding the interaction dummy using µ Sen as a dependent variable for both specications ofμ Sub . Table 7 reports the results of the regression. The overall explanatory power is 70% as given by the adjusted R 2 and therefore slightly higher than in the previous setup. The regressors exhibit the same sign and statistical signicance for both specications ofμ Sub , although the magnitude of the inuence is higher for the caseμ Sub = 0. As before, government support positively inuences the expected senior unsecured recovery rate and this eect is stronger for the period of the nancial crisis. A higher leverage has a negative and higher growth prospects measured with the q-ratio have a positive eect on the senior unsecured recovery rate. Firm size is now statistically signicant and increases the implied recovery rate while the results were insignicant before. The return of the MSCI world index still has a positive inuence. Overall, we conclude that the regression results concerning the inuence of government support hold, regardless of the assumptions we have made in our previous model.
Conclusion
We present a methodology that allows the extraction of the time-series of market expectations of recovery rates using CDS referencing dierent tiers for the same company. Our setup incorporates violations of the absolute priority rule between the senior unsecured and subordinate tier. For this purpose, we empirically determine a rm-specic liability structure to link instrument-specic recovery rates to an expectation of the rm value at default.
An application of our model to a sample of nancial and non-nancial companies located in the United States and Europe shows that expected recovery rates of nancial companies are larger than those of non-nancial companies. We quantify the impact that economic factors have on these recovery rate estimates and nd that a strong cross-sectional and timeseries variation is present. We specically look at the role of government support and show that market participants seem to anticipate government support actions which leads to higher recovery rate expectations especially during the time of the nancial crisis.
Payout function for (v>0)
Figure 1: Instrument-specic payout functions with and without seniority violations:
the gures depict the instrument-specic payout functions for the senior and subordinate creditors dependent on the rm value at default x. The left (right) column shows the instrument specic payout functions for the senior (junior) creditors φ (1) (φ (2) ) for the case without (v = 0) and with seniority violations (v > 0). We further group nancial companies into those having an expected support probability of 90%-100% at least once during the observation period (24 of the 52 nancial companies) and carry forward the latest recovery rate value if it is missing. The vertical lines indicate the start and end date of the nancial crisis. Sum of all claims 100.00 -100.00 -100.00 - -08-2002 and 11-26-2012 . Leverage is dened as the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets in percent, QRatio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, T otal assets is the book value of total assets in bn USD and r M SCI is the weekly return of the MSCI World index in percent. Norden and Weber (2012) ). The two columns one the left assume a subordinate recovery rate of 0, the two columns on the right are based on a subordinate recovery rate of 24.6%, which refers to the mean realized recovery rate (excluding distressed exchanges) for the period 1982-2007 for nancial companies as reported by Ou and Metz (2011) . SupportP rob is the transformed measure of the support likelihood based on the Fitch Support Rating. A dummy for the nancial crisis (Crisis indicates the period from 08-03-2007 to 06-30-2009), Leverage (book value of liabilities / book value of assets), QRatio (market value of assets / book value of assets), the logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln(total assets)) and the weekly return of the MSCI World Index (r M SCI ) are added as control variables. The regression is based on 16,604 weekly observations of the respective recovery rate. We include rm-xed eects, quarterly time-xed eects and an intercept (not reported). The standard-errors standard-errors (given in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
A Model formulas and the Rayleigh distribution
In order to estimate 2.4, we need to specify a probability distribution function f (x) for the rm value at default. We transform the one-parametric Rayleigh distribution, which is dened on [0, ∞), for this purpose. Since we normalize all claims and liability structure parameters by the value of all claims at default, the distribution has to encompass values on (0, 1). The (non-transformed) probability density function g(y) of the Rayleigh distribution is given by
for y, β ≥ 0 We transform the distribution using the transformation theorem for densities
where t(y) = 1 − e −y , t −1 (·) denotes the inverse function and t (·) the derivative of t(·). Applying t(y) to the Rayleigh distribution we obtain the probability density function
Accordingly the expected rm recovery µ is
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Figure 5 shows the transformed Rayleigh distribution for dierent choices of µ.
1−v , the instrument-specic recovery rate for the medium seniority tier µ Sen is then 1 A bank for which there is an extremely high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is very highly rated in its own right and has a very high propensity to support the bank in question. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating oor of`A-'. 1 2 A bank for which there is a high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is highly rated in its own right and has a high propensity to provide support to the bank in question. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating oor of BBB-'.
3
A bank for which there is a moderate probability of support because of uncertainties about the ability or propensity of the potential provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating oor of`BB-'.
4
A bank for which there is a limited probability of support because of signicant uncertainties about the ability or propensity of any possible provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating oor of`B'.
5
A bank for which there is a possibility of external support, but it cannot be relied upon. This may be due to a lack of propensity to provide support or to very weak nancial ability to do so. This probability of support indicates a Long-Term Rating oor no higher than`B-' and in many cases, no oor at all. 0 (2013)). The assignment of dierent probabilities to each of the rating categories follows Gropp et al. (2010) .
D
Realized default events with senior unsecured and subordinate creditors
We combine data from the annual Moody's default review (see e.g. Ou et al. (2013) ) for the years 2008-2012 and collect all available recovery rates from CDS auctions where information on senior unsecured and subordinate creditors is available. 16 Thereof, we select those where senior unsecured creditors receive a payment. We exclude one case where the senior unsecured recovery rate is smaller than 0.1% as well as the defaults of Fannie Mae and Freedie Mac as the senior unsecured and subordinate recovery rates are almost one. If a senior unsecured and a subordinate recovery rate is available in both datasets for a specic default, we use the data from the CDS auction. We also exclude one subsidiary observation where the holding company defaulted as well. If more than one credit tier is available in the CDS auction, we choose the 'B2' tier as the most representative and do not include the other tiers. 
